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Capobianco sees this only as evidence that Sein is die Sache and dismisses its “separability” 
from beings. “Ereignis: (Only) Another Name for Being Itself” continues this rejoinder to 
(a) and (b) which see Ereignis as what “gives Being,” insisting that “Being itself [should] 
be thought as Eriegnis” (49). 
The core of Engaging Heidegger (chapters 3–6) offers us compelling surveys of Heidegger’s 
thinking about being “at home,” Angst/astonishment, and Lichtung/light that adduce evi-
dence of a change in Heidegger’s thinking. Here Capobianco is at his best; for example, 
chapter 3 artfully leads us from Heidegger’s early identification of Unheimlichkeit (“uncan-
niness”) with Dasein’s relation to Being, to the middle Heimkehr (“return home”) revolving 
around readings of Sophocles, to the later, untroubled Heimat in Gelassenheit (“home in 
letting-be”). This coheres well with the chapter “From Angst to Astonishment,” which details 
a similarly nuanced movement from the anxious self-alienation of the early to more pacific, 
joyful later Heidegger. Similarly, in two chapters on Lichtung (“light”), Capobianco shows 
the early Heidegger’s move, by way of the Greeks, from Da-sein as the lighting of Being to 
the later, non-photic clearing of Being, where ‘clearing of Being’ is read subjectively, rather 
than objectively (which would make room for claims made by [a] and [b]).
Chapters 7 and 8 do not seem integral to Capobianco’s argument and lack the scholarly 
tone we see in the earlier chapters. The seventh chapter, on dwelling and architecture, 
is a polemic against deconstructionism/postmodernism and modern architecture that 
caricatures the former as little more than nattering nabobs of negativism and the latter as 
having “no presence and power” (130). In contradistinction to the book’s core, his conclu-
sion that “a strong and even vehement resistance to identity, meaning, and place still holds 
sway in contemporary postmodern thinking” (129) lacks circumspection, nuance, or much 
documentation; the cramped view that favors Victorian architecture against, apparently, 
everything modern sells both Heidegger’s philosophy of art and architecture short, to say 
nothing of deconstruction or postmodernism. 
The final chapter yoking together Heidegger and Lacan via Antigone is the oddest 
and possibly destabilizes Capobianco’s position. Capobianco’s Heidegger is a thinker of 
plenitude, dwelling, identity, joy; Lacan is, if anything, a thinker of lack, painful jouissance, 
absence permeating the symbolic order, and the darkness of the Real. 
Engaging Heidegger succeeds in advancing the cause of establishing Sein as the unchang-
ing Sache of Heidegger’s thinking. Whether the matter is settled remains open, as does the 
question of how sachlich Heidegger’s thinking was of the Sache.
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Iain Thomson’s Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity is an exceptional piece of Heidegger schol-
arship, providing detailed, informative analysis while remaining highly readable.
Thomson begins by reprising the argument from his earlier Heidegger on Ontotheology: 
Technology and the Politics of Education (Cambridge, 2005), namely, that the concept of 
ontotheology is key to understanding Heidegger’s thought. Ontotheologies comprehend 
“the intelligible order in terms of both its innermost core [ontology] and its outermost 
form or ultimate expression [theology]” (10). Thomson examines Heidegger’s claim that 
these understandings of reality change over time, a history of being comprised of distinct 
metaphysical “epochs” of intelligibility. Thomson recounts Heidegger’s project as an at-
tempt to overcome ontotheology, particularly its modern and late-modern forms, in which 
entities appear solely as objects for control or resources for optimization.
Doing so requires cultivating a plural realism whereby entities are recognized as richer 
in intrinsic meaning than we can capture. Thomson shows that Heidegger’s analysis of 
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art—particularly Van Gogh’s “A Pair of Shoes”—is aimed at demonstrating how art over-
flows conceptual boundaries and thereby reveals this plural givenness of meaning. With 
startling originality, Thomson both explains the use of the three artworks in “Origin of 
the Work of Art” in terms of Heidegger’s history of being and refutes Shapiro’s famous 
criticism, arguing that Heidegger is not suggesting that the painting simply represents a 
peasant woman’s shoes. Rather, it represents both the shoes and a plurality of other possible 
meaning gestalts suggested by the umbra of “nothingness” that surrounds the shoes—the 
unformed textures and colors of the background—one of which is the figure of a woman.
The work prompts a gestalt shift from shoes to woman, encouraging us to recognize 
possibilities of meaning in the inchoate forms surrounding the shoes, and thus (Heidegger 
hopes) realize the inexhaustibility of meaning and the structure of intelligibility itself: 
namely, the ontological tension between earth and world, revealing and concealing. Any 
representation is only one of the many conceptual possibilities present, and art helps us 
accomplish a postmodern “active receptivity” that responds adequately to the inexhaust-
ibility of being as such.
The latter half of Thomson’s book engages in “applied Heidegger”: the examination of 
particular works to demonstrate the fruitfulness of understanding Heidegger in this way. By 
analyzing U2’s Achtung Baby, Moore’s Watchmen comic series, and (in a particularly informa-
tive chapter) Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy qua philosophical fugue, Thomson is 
able to pursue the implications of what “postmodernity” means for Heidegger and why it 
should be considered appealing.
Thomson’s thought-provoking and informative book should prompt a great deal of 
discussion. In particular, one can ask whether such a “postmodern” condition represents 
what Thomson and Heidegger hope it does. Thomson suggests throughout that escaping 
late-modern optimization and control narratives will encourage us “to approach all things 
with care, humility, patience, gratitude, and perhaps . . . awe, reverence, and love” (212). 
But why should we suppose that recognizing meaning’s excessiveness and multiplicity 
should produce such positive responses? Is it not equally plausible that it would prompt a 
kind of desiccated ennui, an inability to care or commit that is rooted in the sense that 
there is no right answer, no right way to be? One wonders if living with such recognition 
is even possible, considering the view espoused throughout that intelligibility depends on 
tension between revealing and concealing. What is the proper place for the view that no 
framework of intelligibility is right or adequate, but merely captures one facet of possible 
meaning? Is this compatible with existentialism’s characterization of humanity in terms of 
the need to commit to projects that delimit a normative horizon through which the world 
can show up as intelligible?
Further, though it seems clear that cultivating a poetic responsivity to the given plurality 
of meaning will help overcome Western nihilism—i.e. the view that there is no inherent 
meaning—it is not clear that it will move us beyond ontotheology as Thomson suggests: 
“[T]he radically pluralistic, postmodern age will be the ‘last’ age . . . insofar as it constitutes 
a permanent openness to other possible interpretations, and so to the future” (9n4). But 
Heidegger’s account also offers an understanding of what entities are (i.e. an ontology), 
namely, the locus of being’s different modes of manifestation. Indeed, one can argue that 
with the notion of the “future ones”—those awestruck lovers of meaning plurality—Hei-
degger also offers a “theology”: namely, “an understanding of that ‘highest’. . . entity that 
embodies this kind of being most perfectly” (15).
It is a mark of the book’s strength that it prompts such questioning. Heidegger, Art, and 
Postmodernity is filled with compelling insights not only about Heidegger, but also about 
the nature of art, modernity, and humanity’s hopes for the future. Thomson has remarked 
that when one speaks of ontotheology or postmodernity philosophers tend to look for the 
door. This excellent book will surely change that.
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